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The model can be used to measure the impact of frictions in labour markets using a single
cross-section of matched employer-employee data. The observed matching of workers to
firms is the outcome of a discrete, two-sided matching process where firms with hetero-
geneous preferences over education sequentially choose workers according to an index
correlated with worker preferences over firms. The distribution of education arises in
equilibrium from a Bayesian game: workers, knowing the distribution of worker and firm
types, invest in education prior to the matching process. Although the observed match-
ing exhibits strong cross-sectional dependence due to the matching process, we propose
an asymptotically valid inference procedure that combines discrete choice methods with
simulation.
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21. Introduction
Since the 1980s, economists have attributed rising wage inequality to a number of
sources. One possible source of such inequality is positive assortative matching between
workers and firms - the tendency for the quality of workers and firms who match with
one another to be positively correlated.1 Unfortunately, studying matching in labour mar-
kets presents a serious challenge when the decisions of individual job seekers affect each
other’s hiring outcomes. This paper develops a methodology to address this challenge.
In particular, we show how cross-sections of matched employer-employee data can be
used to study the role that a labour market matching technology plays in shaping the
equilibrium distributions of education and wages. The structural model we develop can
capture assortative matching between workers and firms even in the absence of comple-
mentarities between worker and firm types in the match production function.2
A general overview of the labour market in the model is as follows. Agents from
one side of the market sequentially choose agents from the other side according to their
preferences. Preference rankings of the choosers depend on a preference parameter,
along with the capital of both types of agents. The order in which the choosers pick
depends on the chooser’s capital and a matching technology parameter. Before matching,
the agents who will be chosen are allowed to simultaneously decide their capital given
the distribution of the chooser’s capital and the underlying parameters of the economy
(including the frictions).
This paper contributes to the econometric literature concerned with inference in two-
sided matching models.3 A key feature of our setup is that the characteristics of agents
on one side of the market are endogenous - in particular, arising in equilibrium from a
pre-matching investment game. We show how, rather than making the empirical anal-
ysis intractable, accommodating such pre-matching investments provides the researcher
useful information for inference.4 We propose a two-stage approach for inference on the
agents’ preferences and the matching technology. In the first stage, we fix the matching
1Recent empirical papers examining the role of sorting on wage inequality include Card, Heining and Kline
(2013), Barth, Bryson, Davis and Freeman (2016), and Kantenga and Law (2016).
2The value of a match between any type of worker, h, and any type of firm, k, can be represented using
a positive, increasing function, f(h, k). We say that the types are complements in f when the marginal
product of an h type is higher when matched with a higher k type (and vice versa).
3See Chiappori and Salanie´ (2016) for a review of this literature. A seminal paper in this literature is
Choo and Siow (2006), which considers inference in a transferable utility setup with a continuum of
agents.
4A popular approach for estimating two-sided matching models builds on the notion that the observed
matching is pairwise stable. For example, see Fox and Bajari (2013), Echenique, Lee and Shum (2013),
and Menzel (2015). Requiring that the observed matching be pairwise stable may be unrealistic in the
context of a frictional labour matching market of the sort that is the focus of this paper.
3technology and construct confidence regions for the preference parameter by estimating
the Bayesian game associated with the workers’ pre-match investment in education de-
cision. We show that this problem can be cast in a discrete choice framework yielding
tractable and consistent estimation via maximum likelihood when the workers’ educa-
tional decision takes one of two values (college, or no college). In the second stage,
we construct confidence intervals for the matching technology using a simulation-based
inference approach. In the first stage, the presence of the matching function in work-
ers’ expected utility function makes estimating workers’ equilibrium expectations highly
non-trivial. Nevertheless, under reasonable assumptions, we show that workers’ equilib-
rium expectations can be written in a closed form suitable for consistent estimation. The
second-stage inference on the matching technology uses the following insight: once the
matching process is specified, the finite sample distribution of the observed matching is
known up to a parameter.5 We construct a test statistic that measures the distance be-
tween the observed joint distribution of worker education and matched firm capital to
simulated counterparts. A confidence interval for the matching technology can then be
constructed by inverting the test.
This paper builds on the fundamental insights of Becker (1973) and Gale and Shapley
(1962) to illustrate how an economically meaningful notion of sorting can be captured in
a model that assumes additive worker and firm effects. Since Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis
(1999) (AKM), the availability of matched employer-employee data has allowed re-
searchers to study the role that unobserved worker and firm attributes play in driving
wage variation over time. In AKM, the correlation of worker and firm fixed effects from
wage regressions is taken to capture a notion of sorting. Although popular for inves-
tigating the wage structure, a burgeoning literature has criticised the viability of AKM
for detecting sorting on unobservables. In particular, the additive structure of AKM im-
plies that wages are monotone in firm type - an implication that is difficult to recon-
cile with equilibrium models of sorting with and without frictions (Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011), Lopes de Melo (2018)).6 For example, in Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), a low-
type worker can receive a lower wage at a high-type firm since the worker must implicitly
5This idea of using a structural model to characterize the joint distribution of a discrete matching model
that can then be used for inference on the model parameters builds from Kim, Schwartz, Song and Whang
(2019). Although computationally intractable when the dimension of the parameter is large, this approach
is attractive for inference on the matching technology parameter in the second stage of our approach.
6Gautier and Teulings (2006) was an early empirical study that detected a concave relationship between
wages and firm type.
4compensate the high-type firm in equilibrium for forgoing the opportunity to fill a vacant
job with a higher-type worker.7
In his seminal 1973 paper on the marriage market, Becker argued that when the match
production function is supermodular8 and utility is transferable between matched agents,
high types can outbid low types for the best partners, leading to an equilibrium with
positive assortative matching. In the same paper, Becker noted that sorting can also arise
in an non-transferable utility (NTU) framework when the payoffs of the agents on both
sides of the market are monotonic in the other agent’s type. To explain why, Becker
invokes the notion of pairwise stability Gale and Shapley (1962).9 To illustrate, consider
an economy with four agents where a low-type firm is paired with a high-type worker
and vice-versa. Such a matching is unstable when high types are preferred, because
both high-types will agree to abandon their low-type partners for one another. NTU
arises naturally in our model from the assumption that wages for any matched pair are
determined exogenously (in fact, by a Nash bargaining assumption). In a special case of
our model in which the preferences of agents are indeed monotonic, sorting - and some
inequality - may emerge. In this case, complementarities are not necessary for sorting but
merely amplify the effects of sorting, since interactions between worker and firm types in
the wage function lead to more wage dispersion than when such interactions are absent.
Search and matching models have emerged as the leading alternative to the AKM
framework for studying sorting in labour markets.10 In this literature, the standard match-
ing technology is one that converts aggregates of vacancies and unemployed workers into
matches. Although treating matching at the aggregate level simplifies the analysis con-
siderably, any strategic interdependence that may be present in the matching process is
assumed away (Chade, Eeckhout and Smith (2017)). One contribution of this paper is
to develop and estimate a model that takes such strategic interdependence in the match-
ing process seriously. Capturing such interdependence is desirable, since in many labour
markets the impact of an individual’s decisions on the outcomes of other workers are
7There are other reasons wages may be non-monotonic in firm type. In Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002),
workers may be willing willing to accept lower wages at higher type firms when they expect to receive
higher wages in the future.
8When f is differentiable, (strict) supermodularity is equivalent to ∂2f(h, k)/∂h∂k > 0.
9This insight comes to us by way of Chade, Eeckhout and Smith (2017)’s excellent review of the search
and matching literature.
10Hagedorn, Law and Manovskii (2017), Bagger and Lentz (2018), Lise, Meghir and Robin (2016) and
Lopes de Melo (2018) all find evidence of positive sorting when an AKM approach finds negligible sort-
ing.
5highly relevant and cannot be ignored.11 In the equilibrium of our model, (and in con-
trast to standard search models), the probability that a worker matches to a given firm
typically depends on the decisions of all the other agents in the economy. Another key
facet of search models is that workers direct their job search based on the wages that
employers set for them. However, recent studies of online job markets have found that
it is relatively uncommon for positions to explicitly post wages.12 Another way in which
this paper differs from the traditional search literature is that we do not require workers
do not observe posted wages directly. Instead, workers know the underlying distributions
of job characteristics and the matching process prior to simultaneously investing in edu-
cation. In this sense, the worker’s decision to invest in education is the channel by which
workers are able to direct their search.
The framework in this paper supposes that each equilibrium gives rise to a single large
matching between workers and firms.13 Under familiar assumptions (e.g., iid and separa-
ble private information), we follow similar arguments to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019)
to prove that an equilibrium exists. The setup here, however, also allows us to provide
sufficient conditions for equilibrium uniqueness.
This paper is also part of the literature concerned with estimating cross-sectionally
dependent observations. In our setup, the observed matching of workers to firms ex-
hibits cross-sectional dependence of an unknown form due to the matching process.
This means that asymptotic inference approaches that appeal to the the law of large
numbers and central limit theorems will not work. The approach we pursue builds
on Kim, Schwartz, Song and Whang (2019) which discusses how inference in structural
matching models are possible when knowledge of the matching process can be used to
characterize the joint distribution of the observed matching. This paper shows how such a
simulation-based inference approach, cumbersome when the dimension of the parameter
space is high dimensional or complex, is useful for estimating a subset of the parameters
in structural models with cross-sectional dependence.14
11For example, a worker’s decision to get a master’s degree in finance will not only affect the likelihood
that he gets a job at an investment bank, but also the likelihood that his competitors get the job.
12For example, Marinescu and Wolthoff (2016) study the role of job titles in directing the search of workers
report that only 20% of job the advertisements CareerBuilder.com report a wage.
13This contrasts with cases in which the researcher sees many independent copies of games involving few
players, such as those studied by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), Ciliberto and Tamer (2009), Berry (1992)
and many others. See Xu (2018), Song (2014), Menzel (2016) for more papers discussing the estimation
of large Bayesian games.
14The simulation-based approach used in the second-stage of the inference procedure is known as a Monte
Carlo test. Monte Carlo tests have a history in econometrics dating back at least to the 1950s, as discussed
by Dufour and Khalaf (2001) in their overview of the technique.
6Section 2.3 provides intuition on how our model captures the relationship between
matching frictions, sorting, and inequality. In particular, we illustrate how a fall in
matching frictions can yield two opposing impacts on wage inequality via their effects
on sorting and the supply of highly educated workers. In the model parameterization
considered, a fall in frictions leads to both an increase in the equilibrium supply of highly
educated workers and an increase in positive assortative matching between workers and
firms. That is, the latter sorting effect increases wage inequality while the former supply
effect acts in the opposite direction. In general, the impact of matching frictions on wage
inequality are more pronounced when worker and firm types are complements in the
match production function. The section also illustrates how a fall in information frictions
can lead to a dramatic rise in the education wage premium through sorting while at the
same time, a much more modest increase in the supply of highly educated workers. Thus,
changes in informational frictions may be a useful way to explain a puzzling empirical
findings concerning the relationship between wage premia and educational attainment.15
Section 2 introduces the model of two-sided labour market matching with frictions.
In the baseline model of Section 2.1, workers and firms with exogenous characteristics
match with one another and split the match surplus according to a Nash bargaining rule.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 extends the baseline model to
allow for endogenous worker characteristics - after observing their type, workers simul-
taneously invest in education prior to entering the labour market. Section 3 outlines an
approach for inference on the parameters of the structural model of Section 2.2. Sec-
tion 4 presents a small simulation study illustrating the finite sample size and power
performance of the first-stage inference. Section 5 concludes. Mathematical proofs are
confined to two appendices: Appendix A contains results concerning the existence and
uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game described in Section 2.2 while Appendix B
contains supplemental results relating to the first-stage inference on preferences.
2. The Labour Market As a Two-Sided Matching Market
Our goal is to study the distribution of education and wages using separate cross-
sections of matched employer-employee data. The first subsection introduces the core
15See Card and Lemieux (2001).
7elements of the model that will serve as the basis for the structural model in the second
subsection.
2.1. Baseline model
LetNh = {1, ..., nh} be the set of workers andNf = {1, ..., nf} be the set of firms, where
nh and nf are used to denote the total number of workers and firms, respectively. Each
worker seeks one job and each firm seeks to hire one worker.
The matching of workers to firms will be determined by the preference rankings of
workers and firms. Workers value the capital of firms, K = (Kj)j∈Nf , and firms value the
human capital of workers H = (Hi)i∈Nh , where Kj and Hi are scalars. Any worker i who
is matched with firm j receives wage wij ≥ 0 while firm j receives profit ρji ≥ 0, where
both wages and profits may also depend on a parameter, θ ∈ Rd.16 Since our framework
supposes that wages and profits are always non-negative for any worker and firm that
could match, we will assume throughout the paper that no agent will ever unilaterally
dissolve a match to become unmatched. This requirement that any matching satisfy an
individual rationality constraint is embodied in the following condition:17
Condition IR (Individual rationality of matches): For each i ∈ Nh, and j ∈ Nf wij ≥ 0
and ρji ≥ 0.
Based on the values of ρj = (ρji)i∈Nh each firm j can construct preference rankings
over the workers. We suppose that if the firm is ever indifferent between one or more
workers, then the firm picks preference rankings over these workers at random. Next, we
introduce a condition on the worker’s wage function that will grant us a natural economic
interpretation of the matching process (along with our notion of information frictions).
Condition H (Homogeneous worker preferences): For each i ∈ Nh, the wage of worker i
is increasing in the capital of their matched firm.
The condition is tantamount to a notion of worker preference homogeneity, implying
that all workers prefer higher capital firms. Supposing that workers accurately observe
the capital of firms, the condition implies that a matching algorithm in which the highest
capital firm, j1, choose his preferred worker, i1 ∈ Nh, the second highest capital firm, j2,
16In this setup, θ represents the preferences of both workers and firms. As we will see, wij and ρji depend
on the output of worker i at firm j, and the production function that gives rise to this output will depend
on a part of θ.
17The current setup is tailored to settings where the researcher has at least one cross-section of matched
employer-employee data and the agents who are unmatched are not of primary interest in the analysis. An
interesting (and challenging) extension of the current framework would accommodate the possibility of
unmatched agents, and hence unemployment.
8choose his preferred worker i2 ∈ Nh\{i1} and so on is an example of the serial dictatorship
mechanism and would produce a stable matching.18
In order to build a model that accounts for the possibility of mismatches between work-
ers and firms, we suppose that information frictions are present in the market. Specifi-
cally, we suppose that workers do not directly observe realizations of the firm’s capital.
Instead, each worker sees v = (vj)j∈Nf , where vj is a ‘noisy’ measure of firm j’s capital.
In particular, suppose that workers see
(2.1) vj = βKj + ηj,
for each j, where β ∈ B, B ⊂ R is the parameter space of β, and ηj is a random variable
that is independent across j. The size of the variance of ηj relative to the magnitude
β represents the magnitude of information frictions in the matching process. It is clear
that when β is zero and the variance of ηj is positive, then this setup yields random
matching from firm to worker the characteristics, since variation across firm capital plays
no role in determining the realizations of v. Furthermore, when β 6= 0 and Var(ηj) = 0,
it will be as if firm capital is observed by the worker, since vj is determined entirely
by the firm’s capital. In the latter case, when β > 0 workers would favour firms with
the largest realizations of v, while in the case that β < 0, workers would favour firms
with the smallest realizations of v. However, even in the case that Var(ηj) > 0, vj still
conveys some useful information to the worker under certain circumstances. To see this,
suppose that vj ’s follow equation 2.1 with β > 0 and let ηj ’s be iid
19. Then, any worker
who sees vj1 exceed vj2 will prefer matching with Firm j1 over Firm j2, since the worker
recognizes that the distribution of Kj1 conditional on vj1 = v˜j1 stochastically dominates
the distribution of of Kj2 conditional on vj2 = v˜j2 when the worker observes v˜j1 > v˜j2.
The following condition specifies the matching process we will use throughout the
paper.
Condition SD (Matching process): The matching of workers to firms in the economy arises
as follows. The highest v firm, j1, chooses his preferred worker, i1 ∈ Nh, the second highest
v2 firm, j2, chooses his preferred worker i2 ∈ Nh\{i1}, and so on, until the lowest v firm,
jnf , chooses his preferred worker among those not chosen by any higher ranked firms.
One way of understanding this matching algorithm in economic terms is to consider the
following thought experiment. Imagine a situation in which a group of job-seekers have
assembled in a large room on the day of a job fair. Workers do not observe the true quality
18Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein (1981). See Section 2.2. of Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
19We will impose such an assumption in a later section.
9of any of the firms, (represented by K), but they do see each firm’s value of v. When
β > 0 and ηj ’s are iid, each worker is happiest to match with the highest v firm, since
the distribution of capital associated with the highest v firm stochastically dominates the
distribution of capital associated with any of the lower v firms. A procedure in which
the highest v firm, j1, chooses his preferred worker, i1 ∈ Nh, the second highest capital
firm, j2, chooses his preferred worker i2 ∈ Nh\{i1} and so on, will have no complaints
from any of the participants at the job fair – that is, until uncertainty associated with K
is revealed. In this world, agents will typically have more regret (and hence a greater
desire to rematch) when the frictions in v are large. However, rematching is outside the
scope of the model.
Next, we add some further structure to wages and profits. In particular, we will assume
that the payoffs for any two matched agents follow a Nash bargaining structure. Let
τ ∈ (0, 1) be the bargaining weight. A worker i who matches with a firm j receives
wij = τf(Hi, Kj) + (1− τ)g(Hi) and(2.2)
ρji = (1− τ) (f(Hj, Kj)− g(Hi)) ,
where f is the worker-firm output function and g(Hi) is an outside option function, both
of which may depend on elements of θ. In a subsequent section, we will allow worker
covariates, Xi, to effect wages through the outside option function, g.
20 The following
condition requires f to satisfy some intuitive properties with respect to the worker and
firm capital variables.
Condition F (Production function): f is increasing in human capital and firm capital.
Condition F merely requires that more capital leads to more output - it does not impose
that the worker and firm attributes be complements in f . Section 2.2 goes into further
detail about the role of f in this model.
2.2. Frictional Matching Model with Worker Investments
We now introduce a structural model where workers simultaneously invest in educa-
tion prior to the serial dictatorship matching process as outlined in the previous section.
A general overview of the matching process is as follows: i) workers, observing only their
type, simultaneously choose a level of education, ii) v is realized, iii) firms, seeing only
the education of workers, match according to Condition SD.
20Xi’s have support X ⊂ Rd, where d is an integer greater than or equal to one.
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Although firms select their preferred workers in the serial dictatorship phase after con-
structing preference rankings over the workers, firms are not considered strategic agents
within the context of the investment game itself.
There are nh players indexed by i ∈ Nh. Each player chooses an education level, hi,
from the discrete set H ≡ {1, ..., J} to maximize their expected payoff. Let λ = (θ′, β),
where β is the matching frictions parameter and θ ∈ Rd is a preference parameter. The
payoff function of player i comprises the wage less a cost of education,
(2.3) u(hi, h−i, xi, k, η, εi;λ) = ω(hi, h−i, xi, k, η;λ)− c(hi, xi, εi;λ),
where h−i ∈ H−i are the choices of the other agents,
21 xi ∈ X and εi ∈ R
J are the private
information of worker i, and k ∈ Rnf and η ∈ Rnf are vectors of exogenous firm variables
that are unobserved by the workers. Although εi and xi are private information of the
worker, we will assume xi is observed by the econometrician in a subsequent section. The
variable εi represents the worker’s private cost associated with each of the J education
levels. In Section 3.2 we will supply explicit assumptions on worker and firm information
that illustrates why, given the matching process, the components of the payoff function
depend on model’s underlying variables in the way stipulated by equation (2.3).
We now provide additional conditions that establish the existence of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for our game (which we prove in Section 6).
Assumption 2.1. (a) Kj ’s, ηj ’s are independent across j. Xi’s, εi’s are independent across
i. X, K, ε, and η are independent. (b) εi’s are continuously distributed.
Assumption 2.2. The cost function is separable in private information:
c(hi, xi, εi;λ) = c0(hi, xi;λ) + ε
′
id(hi),
where d(hi) is a J-dimensional vector with one in the hi-th row and zero otherwise.
The assumptions of separability and independence are common in the structural litera-
ture.22 In Section 6, we show that Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are sufficient for establishing
the existence of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium for the game of this section. For now,
we will provide some intuition into the worker’s education decision problem. First, we
define the set of pure strategies as σ = {σi(xi, εi) : i ∈ Nh} where σi is a function that
maps from X ×RJ−1 into H. Assumption 2.2 says that we can write the expected utility
of agent i with covariates xi, who chooses hi under beliefs σ as
Ui(hi, xi, σ, εi) = U˜i(hi, xi, σ) + ε
′
id(hi),(2.4)
21Since the set of pure strategies for each agent is H, it follows that H−i = H
nh−1 for each i, whereHnh−1
denotes the (nh − 1)-ary Cartesian power of H.
22For example, see the discussions in Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and Xu (2014).
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where the first term in the expected utility is
U˜i(hi, xi, σ) =
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)P−i(h−i|σ),(2.5)
and
(2.6) u˜i(hi, h−i, xi) ≡ ω˜i(hi, h−i, xi)− c0(hi, xi),
where ω˜i(hi, h−i, xi) is given by
ω˜i(hi, h−i, xi) = E[ω(Hi, H−i, Xi, K, η;λ)|Hi = hi, H−i = h−i, Xi = xi],
and expectation is taken with respect to the distributions of K and η. By Lemma (6.1)m
we can rewrite equation 2.5 as
U˜i(hi, xi, σ) =
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)
∏
j∈Nh\{i}
Pj(hj |σj).
Throughout this paper, we will consider the case in which the wages of workers are
determined by Nash bargaining. As in equation 2.2, we will suppose that firm capital only
enters the worker’s payoff through the production function. DenoteM(i) as the identity
of the firm that worker i matches to as a result of the matching process, and KM(i) as
the level of capital associated with firm M(i). Under these assumptions, we may write
ω˜i(hi, h−i, xi) as
ω˜i(hi, h−i, xi) = τ f˜i(hi, h−i) + (1− τ)g(hi, xi),(2.7)
where
f˜i(hi, h−i) = E[f(Hi, KM(i))|Hi = hi, H−i = h−i, Xi = xi],
the expectation is taken with respect to the distributions ofK and η, and we have allowed
the worker’s characteristics to enter the payoff function through the outside option func-
tion, g.23
Education affects the worker’s expected utility in a number of ways. The first two are
obvious: since f is increasing in hi by Condition F, the worker who invests in a higher
level of education obtains a higher wage at any firm he matches to. The worker’s choice
of education also affects his payoff through the outside option function, g. The novel
channel in this setup is that hi also determines the expected quality of the firm that i
matches to. Even though (as mentioned before) firms in this model are non-strategic
23Here, τi = τ for each i. The framework here can be extended to incorporate heterogeneity in worker bar-
gaining positions. Bagger and Lentz (2018) emphasize the importance of endogenous search intensity and
matching variation (e.g., Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002)) in understanding the causes of wage inequality.
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agents, the functional form of the production function, f , plays a key role in determin-
ing whether or not firms with different levels of capital exhibit different preferences for
workers of differing levels of education. To see how f determines whether or not firms’
preferences are heterogeneous, consider the Nash bargaining preferences of a firm for
any worker who chooses education level h:
(2.8) ρ(k, h; θ) = (1− τ)(f(h, k; θ)− g˜(h; θ)),
where g˜ = Eg(h,Xi) and the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Xi.
24
Suppose that Xi is iid, K takes two values k1, k2 and there are two levels of education,
h1, h2 with h2 > h1. Let us denote the set of firms that prefer high education (h2) as
M+2 (θ) = {m ∈ {1, 2} : ρ(km, h2; θ) ≥ ρ(km, h1; θ)}.
If f(h, k) is of the form a(h)+b(k), where a and b are two functions that map the capital
variables to the real numbers, then M+2 (θ) will be either {1, 2} or ∅. In this case we say
that firms have homogeneous preferences, since both types of firms in the economy prefer
the higher educated workers. Alternatively, if f(h, k) is of the form a(h)b(k) then M+2 (θ)
will be either {1, 2}, ∅, or {2}. This is the case of heterogeneous firm preferences. In this
latter case where f exhibits complementarities in worker and firm types, the set of firms
types that prefer high to low education is more finely partitioned. Moreover, the presence
or absence of complementarities will play a key role in determining the severity of wage
inequality. More general than all these points, however, is the following fact about the
model: as long as k appears somewhere in f , k does not have to interact directly with
h in f for the information frictions represented by β to matter in worker’s investment
decision.
2.3. Some Implications of Frictional Matching Model
In this section, we explore some key features of the model. We will suppose that
the functional forms, underlying distributions, and firm preferences are such that firms
always strictly prefer higher educated workers. In the following subsection, we will il-
lustrate sorting without any direct interactions between worker and firm types in the
production function.
2.3.1. Sorting Without Complementarities. In Figure 1 and Figure 2, we compare the
equilibrium probability of investing in education and the equilibrium Gini coefficient for
24Here, we implicitly assume that firms do not observe workers’ covariates and rank workers only in terms
of their education. We make these assumptions concerning firm information explicit in a subsequent sec-
tion.
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a range of the friction parameters under two specifications of the production function:
Specification 1 allows direct interaction between worker and firm types, f = θ1hk, while
such interactions are absent in Specification 2, f = θ1(h+k). Each point on the plot is the
average of 500 simulations of endogenous variable from the equilibrium of the model.
The outside option parameter is set to θ2 = (−.75, .25, .5). There are 500 workers and
firm positions. In Specification 1, the high value of θ1 is 3, and the low value of θ1 is 1.
In Specification 2, the high value of θ1 is 2, and the low value of θ1 is 1. There are two
levels of of firm capital: K = 1/2 andK = 1. The fraction of each type of firm is .5 in the
economy.25
A number of implications are straightforward: the equilibrium probability of investing
in high education is higher when θ1 is higher and frictions are lower. When θ1 is higher,
workers will be compensated more for higher levels of education. When β is higher, the
probability of matching to a higher type firm when they choose high education is higher.
The effect of increasing β (lowering matching frictions) on both the education and
wage inequality is typically much more dramatic in Specification 1. A rise in β (a less-
ening in matching frictions) increases sorting in both specifications. In Figure 1, the
correlation between worker and firm types rises from approximately zero to 45% when
θ1 is high, but from zero to 70% when θ1 is lower; in Figure 2, the correlation between
worker and firm types rises from zero to 51% in the high theta case whereas it rises from
zero to 68% in the low theta case. The overall level of inequality in Specification 1 is also
higher since whatever sorting is present is amplified to a greater extent when the types
interact in the wage equation than when they do not.
The high θ1 case in the right hand panel of Figure 1 also illustrates the role that two
competing effects of changes in β play on the level of wage inequality. When β rises
from 0 to 1, the level of inequality increases through the sorting channel. However, as
β continues rises, the equilibrium probability of investing in education also continues to
rise. As the fraction of highly educated surpasses 80%, the level of inequality begins to
level off (at β = 2) and then begins to fall. This phenomenon is also illustrated to a lesser
degree in the high θ1 case of the right hand side panel of Figure 2.
25Across all the specifications, we set the outside option function to be g = exp(h · xθ2).
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FIGURE 1. Education and Wage Inequality Under Specification 1
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FIGURE 2. Education and Wage Inequality Under Specification 2
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Figures 1 and 2 plot the equilibrium probability of high education investment and the Gini coef-
ficient for a range of values of the matching frictions parameter, β in cases where firms all prefer
higher-educated workers. We consider two specifications for the production function: Specification
1 includes interactions between worker and firm types while Specification 2 does not. Lowering
matching frictions (increasing β) increases the equilibrium level of education across specifications.
A rise in β impacts inequality through two competing effects: a sorting effect that increases inequal-
ity and an a supply effect that lowers inequality. This can be seen most dramatically in Figure 1:
as β rises past a value of three, the fraction of highly educated rises more and more and inequality
falls, dominating the effects of sorting on inequality.
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2.3.2. Supply of Highly Educated Workers and Education Premia. In this section, we
show how simulation of our static model can capture a puzzling phenomenon discussed
in Card and Lemieux (2001). How can dramatic increases in the education wage pre-
mium lead to only modest increases in the supply of highly educated workers? The au-
thors note that, over a roughly 30 year period beginning in the early 1970s, the college-
high school wage gap rose considerably in the United States, Canada, and the United
Kingdom, and that this rise occurred mostly for younger workers. They argue that an im-
portant source of this trend is a stagnation in the rate of educational attainment among
workers born in the 1950s and thereafter.
In Figure 3, we show how this pattern can be driven entirely by changes in the matching
technology over time. The wage premium is measured as the difference between the
average wages of the workers with high education and the average wages of workers
with low education. Each point on the plot represents the average of 500 simulations of
the model. We use Specification 1, f = θ1hk, under the same setup as before with only
one difference; we choose the low value of θ1 to be 0.7 and the high θ1 to be 2.5. In the
case that θ1 is very low, the effect of raising β is to dramatically increase sorting without
inducing a large benefit to the workers from acquiring education in equilibrium.
FIGURE 3. Supply of Highly Educated Workers and Education Wage Premia
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Figures 3 offers an explanation to an empirical puzzle discussed in Card and Lemieux (2001): why
are increases in wage premia not associated with large increases in the supply of highly educated
workers? We plot the equilibrium probability of high education investment and the returns to educa-
tion for a range of values of the matching frictions parameter, β when firms prefer higher education.
In the case that θ1 is very low, the effect of increasing β is to dramatically increase sorting while
keeping the equilibrium returns to education for any particular worker reasonably low.
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3. Econometric Inference
In this section, we outline the general empirical strategy for performing inference on
the underlying model parameters. In Section 3, we describe how the main model can
be used to characterize the observed distribution of the matching of workers to firm and
hence the wages of all the workers in the economy. The goal is to then use these rep-
resentations to construct confidence regions for the preference and matching technology
parameters.
However, if the model is high dimensional, the Monte Carlo inference approach may
be cumbersome to apply in practice. For this reason, we propose a two-stage inference
approach that relies on the construction of a first-stage confidence interval for a subset
of the model parameters. We demonstrate this approach in practice in Section 3.2 by
estimating the Bayesian game from 2.2 for fixed values of β.
3.1. Two-Stage Inference Accommodating Cross-Sectional Dependence of
Observed Matching
The econometrician observes a matching of workers to firms, M = (M(i))i∈Nh , where
for each i ∈ Nh, M(i) takes values in the set of firms.
26 The main challenge associated
with inference is the fact that the distribution of M exhibits cross-sectional dependence
of a complicated form. The matching of workers to firms can be thought of as discrete
choice problem on the part of the firm where the choice sets of firms are endogenously
constrained by the choices of firms with higher v-indices, which depends on β, η and
k. Hence, the event that worker i matches to firm j cannot be considered independent
from the event that a worker i′ 6= i matches to firm j. Also, the fact that firm preferences
may be heterogeneous means we cannot condition on the v-index and firm preferences in
a way to remove the cross-sectional dependence as was done by Diamond and Agarwal
(2017).
The econometrician observes the vector M ∈ Rnh, which represents a matching of
workers to firms. Given the serial dictatorship matching process, the joint distribution of
M is known up to a parameter. Let K = (K(i))i∈Nh, where K(i) = KM(i); i.e., the capital
of the firm matched to by worker i.
Our model also implies that the finite sample distribution of wages, (W(i))i∈Nh, is
known up to a parameter. Under Nash bargaining (and a specification of the post-match
26Throughout this paper, we will suppose that the matching is one-to-one between workers and firms. In
practice, “firms” in this context can be viewed as positions at particular firms.
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wage function based off an equation such as 2.2), we have for each i ∈ Nh
W(i) = w(Hi,K(i)).
We denote all the match-related observables as Y = (K,M). M is observed whenever
the researcher has matched employer-employee data. K is observed when the researcher
can use the matching data,M, and the firm capital data, K, to find the capital of the firm
each worker in the sample is employed at. Using Y and worker observables H and X,
the econometrician wishes to infer λ0.
3.1.1. Finite Sample Inference on Parameters. Next, we consider a test statistic that
matches the moments of the distribution of the matched-related observables with their
simulated counterparts. To simplify the exposition, we discuss the construction of a
confidence interval for β0 alone, i.e., supposing that we knew the true values of θ0.
Denote R + 1 as the total number of simulations in the Monte Carlo inference proce-
dure. Drawing ηr from some continuous parametric distribution function,
27 we simulate
a version of the matching for each β ∈ B and each r = 1, ..., R + 1, which we write as
Mr(β) = {Mr(i; β) : i ∈ Nh}. The simulated wages are then
Wr(i; β) = w(Hi, KMr(i;β))).
It is convenient to define
Yr(β) = {Yr(i; β) : i ∈ Nh},
YR+1(β) = {Yr(i; β) : i ∈ Nh, r = 1, ..., R + 1}, and
Y−r(β) = YR+1(β)\Yr(β).
Next, we will propose a test statistic that depends on both the observed matching data,
Y, and the simulated matching data, (along with simulated versions of this test statistic).
That is,
T (β) = φn(Y,YR(β)), and
Tr(β) = φn(Yr(β),Y−r(β)).
An example of such a test statistic is one that compares the observed joint distribution
of worker human capital and matched firm capital with simulated counterparts. For
27We will specify a particular parametric family that this distribution belongs to, along with additional
assumptions, in Section 3.2.
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example, we may consider the test statistic28
T (β) =
1
R
R∑
r=1
max
h,m
|Pˆ (h,m;Y, H)− Pˆ (h,m;Yr(β), H)|,
where
Pˆ (h,m;Y, H) =
1
nh
∑
i∈Nh
1{Hi = h,KM(i) = m}.
That is, Pˆ is an J ×M matrix29 whose (j,m) element is the estimated probability that a
worker of education level hj matches to a firm of capital levelm. Pˆr(β) is defined similarly
to Pˆ , except we replace the observed matching with the rth simulated matching, Mr(β).
Using our test statistic, we may compute a confidence region for β as
Cβα,R = {β ∈ B : T (β) ≤ cα,R(β)},
where the critical value is computed as the (1− α) -quantile of the empirical distribution
of {Tr(β) : r = 1, ..., R}:
cα,R(β) = inf
{
c ∈ R :
1
R
R∑
r=1
1{Tr(β) ≤ c} ≥ 1− α
}
.
Under Assumption 3.2, it can easily be shown that finite sample inference on β0 satisfies
P{β0 ∈ C
β
α,R} ≥ 1 − α when the procedure outlined above involves the true parameter,
θ0.
In practice, we do not know the true value of θ0. In situations in which the full param-
eter vector λ0 is not very large, it may be feasible to construct a (1 − α)100% confidence
region for this parameter that exhibits finite sample validity. That is, we construct
(3.1) Cλα,R = {λ ∈ Λ : T (λ) ≤ cα,R(λ)},
where T (λ) and cα,R(λ) are defined analogously to T (β) and cα,R(β). In the case that
Λ is high-dimensional, the finite sample procedure outlined above may not be practical
due to the unreasonable computational cost. In the following subsection, we explore a
two-stage inference approach that admits inference on β0 when the researcher is able to
construct a first-stage confidence region for a subset of the parameters, θ0.
Note that plugging in a consistent estimator of θ0, θˆn, for the true value in inference
procedure outlined above will generally not lead to valid inference on β0. This is because
28This test statistic is similar to the one used in Kim, Schwartz, Song and Whang (2019). See also
Diamond and Agarwal (2017).
29In this example, we are implicitly assuming that the distribution of K is discrete and has M support
points. We will make this assumption explicit in a subsequent section.
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there is no reason to expect that plugging in θˆn for θ0 will make the distribution of the
simulated matching,Mr, equal to the distribution of the observed matching,M. The fact
thatMr is not equal in distribution toM, in turn implies thatKr does not follow the same
distribution as K. The severe consequences of estimation error in θˆn occur because the
firm preferences are typically misspecified at all values of θ other than the true value, θ0.
Moreover, this problem is not alleviated by conditioning onH,K, or exogenous variables.
In the following section, we discuss a general two-stage inference approach that can be
used when the econometrician can construct an (asymptotically) valid confidence first-
stage confidence interval for θ0. In Section 2.2, we extend our baseline economic model
of Section 2 in a manner that admits the application of this two-stage inference approach
to our setup.
3.1.2. Two-Stage Inference on β using Test-Inversion Confidence Interval. Suppose
that we wish a (1 − α)-level asymptotic confidence interval for β0, and can construct
a confidence interval for θ0. Let us denote the test statistic and its simulated counter-
part from the previous section, where the θ arguments make explicit the test statistic’s
dependence upon a given value of θ ∈ Θ:
T (β; θ0, θ1) = φn(Y(β0, θ0),YR(β, θ1)), and
Tr(β; θ˜, θ1) = φn(Yr(β, θ˜),Y−r(β, θ1)).
Note that according to the notation we used in the last section we have T (β; θ0, θ0) =
T (β). Our inference on β proceeds in two steps:
Step 1. Using the first stage estimates of θˆ(β), we construct a confidence region for θ0,
Cˆα/2(β), with (1− (α/2)) asymptotic coverage.
Step 2. Next, we construct a test statistic that doesn’t involve θ. Define
S(β) = inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2(β)
T (β; θ0, θ1), and
S∗r (β) = sup
θ˜∈Cˆα/2(β)
inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2(β)
Tr(β; θ˜, θ1).
We now construct a confidence set for β as
(3.2) Cˆα,R = {β ∈ B : S(β) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β)},
where the critical value c∗1−(α/2),R(β) is computed as the (1 − (α/2)) -quantile of the em-
pirical distribution of {S∗r (β) : r = 1, ..., R}; that is,
c∗1−(α/2),R(β) = inf
{
c ∈ R :
1
R
R∑
r=1
1{S∗r (β) ≤ c} ≥ 1− (α/2)
}
.
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The following lemma establishes the asymptotic validity of the two-stage inference
procedure.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that the econometrician can construct Cˆα/2(β0) such that
lim
n→∞
P
(
θ0 ∈ Cˆα/2(β0)
)
≥ 1− (α/2).
Then
(3.3) lim
n→∞
P
(
β0 ∈ Cˆα,R
)
≥ 1− α.
Proof. By the definition of Cˆα,R, P
(
β0 ∈ Cˆα,R
)
is equal to
P
(
S(β0) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β0)
)
= P
(
inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2(β0)
T (β0; θ0, θ1) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β0)
)
≥ P
[{
inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2(β0)
T (β0; θ0, θ1) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β0)
}
∩ A1
]
,(3.4)
where A1 ≡
{
θ0 ∈ Cˆα/2(β0)
}
. Then, the right hand side of the right hand side of (3.4) is
greater than or equal to
P
[{
sup
θ˜∈Cˆα/2(β0)
inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2 (β0)
Tr(β0; θ˜, θ1) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β0)
}
∩A1
]
,
≥ P
(
sup
θ˜∈Cˆα/2(β0)
inf
θ1∈Cˆα/2 (β0)
Tr(β0; θ˜, θ1) ≤ c
∗
1−(α/2),R(β0)
)
− P (Ac1) .
Now since
lim
n→∞
P
(
θ0 /∈ Cˆα/2(β0)
)
≤ α/2,
we have
lim
n→∞
P
(
β0 ∈ Cˆα,R
)
≥ 1− α.

In the following section, we provide assumptions under which we can construct a con-
fidence region for θ0 using a maximum likelihood approach. In Section 7.2, we argue
that θ0 is identified up to β0, and provide standard conditions under which the maxi-
mum likelihood estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal. In Section 4, we then
present a small Monte Carlo study that illustrates how this estimator can be used as the
basis for the first-stage inference on preferences. In particular, we show how a parametric
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bootstrap can be used to construct a Cˆα,R with reasonable finite sample size and power
properties.
3.2. First-Stage Estimation of Preferences
In this section, we show how θ can be estimated for a particular fixed value of β. We
will write an estimator of such an object as θˆ(β). The main challenge associated with
this problem is that of estimating the worker’s expected utility from equation 2.6. The
problem is difficult because the workers must somehow resolve uncertainty associated
with the serial dictatorship matching process in order to compute the expected output
under the equilibrium education choices. In spite of these complications, it turns out
that, under reasonable assumptions, the parameters are tractably estimable using discrete
choice methods with a fixed point constraint when there are only two education choices.
We now provide and discuss these assumptions.
Assumption 3.1. (a) Firms observe (i) workers’ education decisions, H, and (ii) the distri-
bution of characteristics, X. (b) Workers observe (i) the distribution of firm capital, (ii) the
distribution of η, (iii) the distribution of X, and (iv) the distribution of the number of firms
preferring each education level hj ∈ H.
Under part (a) of Assumption 3.1, firms do not take covariates into account when form-
ing their preference rankings over workers. Thus, workers with the same education level
are equally desirable to any given firm. When worker i considers the desirability of choos-
ing education hj , he need only consider the capital a generic agent who chooses level hj
expects to receive in the matching process. In many contexts, (a) will be reasonable
for a host of variables that affects the worker’s education decision (e.g., marital status,
number of dependent children).30 Part (b) says that workers know only the distribution
of firm capital without knowing the precise realizations of capital. Assumption 3.1 (b)
also stresses that the worker’s knowledge of the distribution of capital is not sufficient for
knowledge of the distribution of the number of firms that prefers each education class,
which will turn out to be crucial for our results of this section.
Assumption 3.2. (a) K is discrete with probability mass q = (qm)
M
m=1, where for m =
1, ...,M , qm = P (K = km).
(b) ηj ’s are iid N(0, σ
2) (c) εi’s follow the Type I extreme value distribution.
Part (a) says the distribution of firm capital has discrete support. In practice, we can
let M be as large as our application requires. In concert with (b) and the parametric
30In some cases in which employers do see these worker characteristics, they are prohibited from discrimi-
nating based on them due to state or federal anti-discrimination laws.
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structure for v stipulated by equation 2.1, (a) allows us to express the unconditional
distribution of vj as a mixture of normals, G ≡
∑M
m=1 qmFm, where Fm is N(βkm, σ
2).31
Part (c) is an assumption on the worker’s unobserved costs that allows us to estimate the
model parameters using conventional discrete choice methods.
We wish to obtain a convenient representation of each worker’s conditional expectation
of the production function, for each education level that the worker can choose. Under
the model of Section 2.2 the identity of the firm that worker i matches with, M(i),
depends on K, H, β, and, θ. Therefore, for each i ∈ Nh and hj ∈ H, we wish to estimate
f˜ij ≡ E[f(Hi, KM(i))|Hi = hj , Xi = xi],
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of K, H−i and η. Under
Assumption 3.2 (a), we can express the expectation on the preceding line as
(3.5) f˜ij = f
′
jπ
(i)
j ,
where fj = (fj1, ..., fjm)
′ is an M × 1 vector with the m-th element of fj given as fjm =
f(hj, km) and π
(i)
j = (π
(i)
1j , ..., π
(i)
Mj)
′ is an M × 1 vector with the m-th element of π
(i)
j given
as
π
(i)
mj =
∑
h−i∈H−i
P (M(i) = m|Hi = hj , H−i = h−i, Xi = xi)P (h−i|xi).(3.6)
This is the probability that worker i matches to a firm of capital level km when he has
chosen education level hj .
32 Given that there are M education levels, J choices, and
nh workers, the dimensionality of the problem appears daunting. However, under our
assumptions the problem is simplified considerably, and we can show that for each j and
m, π
(i)
mj = πmj , and hence, f˜ij = f˜j .
33
Although it is unclear how to represent πmj ’s analytically when the worker faces a
choice between a large number of education levels, the problem becomes tractable when
there are only two (i.e., J = 2). Proposition 7.1 shows that under our informational
assumptions, firms (and workers) cannot distinguish between workers with the same ed-
ucation level during the matching process. As a consequence, we find that a worker is
only concerned with the number of other workers who picked one of the two education
levels (and not which particular workers chose what). Independence and identical distri-
butions assumptions imply that the probability that nj workers picked education level hj
31In the simulation sections of the paper we normalize σ2 = 1 when we perform inference on the model
parameters.
32Note that although these terms depend on θ and β, we will occasionally omit these from our notation for
convenience.
33The argument for why this is the case is given in the proof of Proposition 7.1.
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can be represented using the binomial probability mass function. However, the number
of workers choosing education level hj is unknown to workers, so they must take expec-
tations. Thus, instead of having to sum over nh − 1 indices associated with actions of
each of the other workers to compute the worker’s expectation, we need only sum over
one: the number of workers choosing a particular education level.
We will also allow θ to enter πmj ’s through the distribution of the number of firms that
prefer high (or low) education. The following assumption is a natural way to specify
this distribution. We use the notation M+j (θ) to denote the set of firm types that prefer
education level hj .
34
Assumption 3.3. In the model with J = 2, the probability that exactly n(j) firms prefer
workers with education level hj follows the binomial distribution with probability
∑
m∈M+j (θ)
qm.
The explicit representation of the matching probabilities are given in Propositions 7.2,
7.3, and Lemma 7.1. These results can be used to construct estimates of the πmj ’s -
and hence the f˜j ’s - for fixed values of θ and β. Using a given functional form for the
production function, we denote an estimate of the expected production function when
the worker chooses education level hj as
fˆj(θ, β) = f
′
j πˆj(θ, β),
where our notation emphasizes the dependence of the objects upon the parameter values.
To construct πˆmj ’s we must estimate the terms of equation 7.5. Pˆ (nj) is constructed as
B(nj ;nh − 1, pˆj) where the latter denotes the binomial probability mass function with
pˆj = P (Hi = hj).
35 Similarly, Pˆ (n(j); θ) is constructed as B(nj ;nh − 1, qˆj(θ)), where
qˆj(θ) =
∑
m∈Mˆ+j (θ)
qˆm, with qˆm = Pˆ (Kj = m),
Mˆ+j (θˆ) = {m ∈ {1, ...,M} : ρˆ(km, hj; θ) ≥ ρˆ(km, hj′; θ), j 6= j
′} ,
and ρˆ(km, hj; θ) is as in equation (2.8), except we use gˆj =
1
n
∑n
i=1 g(hj, Xi) in place of g˜.
Lastly, the Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m)’s, from equation 7.5 - that is, the probability that a worker
matches to a firm of typemwhen they choose education level hj , nj other workers choose
hj , and n
(j) firms prefer hj - can be simulated for fixed values of θ and β. Propositions 7.2
and 7.3 show how these can be represented using probabilities involving order statistics.
34That is, M+j (θ) = {m ∈ {1, ...,M} : ρ(km, hj; θ) ≥ ρ(km, hj′ ; θ), j 6= j
′}. See also the discussion before
Proposition 7.2.
35In so doing, we pursue a two-step approach for estimating the choice probabilities, such as
Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2013). See for example Kasahara and Shimotsu (2012) for an alternative
approach.
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Under Assumption 3.2 (b), we can construct Pˆhj ,nj ,n(j)(m)’s by averaging functions of
simulated draws of beta-distributed random variables.36
Once we have estimated fˆj(θ, β) for each education level, we may use the specification
of the wage from equation 2.7 to write the expected wage as
ωˆji(θ, β) =τ fˆj(θ, β) + (1− τ)g(Hi, Xi; θ).(3.7)
When there are two choices (J = 2), the worker chooses high education (hj = 1) if and
only if
U∗1i − U
∗
i0 > 0.
Under the assumption that εi’s follow the extreme value distribution (Assumption 3.2),
the probability that worker i chooses high education can be written as
pˆi(θ, β) =
exp(ωˆ1i(θ, β)− ωˆ0i(θ, β))
1 + exp(ωˆ1i(θ, β)− ωˆ0i(θ, β))
.
Since the covariates {Xi}
n
i=1 are iid we can write the joint likelihood as the product of the
marginal likelihoods. We can then define the estimator of θ (for a fixed value of β) as the
minimizer of the standard logit likelihood function:37
lnLn(θ, β) = −
n∑
i=1
[hi ln pˆi(θ, β) + (1− hi) ln(1− pˆi(θ, β))] .
3.3. Matching Probabilities
In this section, we consider the role of frictions, or the magnitude of β0 relative to
the variance of η, in shaping matching patterns between workers and firms. Note that
these frictions play no role in determing firm preferences, or which firm types prefer high
education.38 Nevertheless, because the frictions do affect sorting patterns, they are of
considerable importance to workers when they decide how much to invest in education.
In the following example, we will suppose that that the set of firms that prefer educa-
tion level hj , M
+
j , contains at least two types of firms, m and m˜ with km 6= km˜. Suppose
36In particular, see Corollaries 7.1 and 7.2, which follow the order statistic result in Lemma 7.1.
37When β is fixed, maximizing the likelihood by computing the fˆj(θ, β)’s for each candidate value of θ
can be slow. The following strategy can be used to estimate θ for fixed β more quickly provided that the
support of K is not too large. First, note that θ enters fˆj(θ, β) only through the set of firm types that
prefer education level hj , Mˆ
+
j (θ). Given our assumptions on the production function and firm preferences,
Mˆ+j (θ) must take one of M + 1 possible values. Therefore, for fixed β , we can avoid simulating fˆj(θ, β)
for each candidate value of θ by pre-allocating the qˆj(θ)’s and Phj ,nj,n(j)(m)’s for each of the M + 1 cases
for Mˆ+j (θ). It then suffices to evaluate Mˆ
+
j (θ), select the appropriate dimension of the array of terms, then
assemble the terms according to equation 7.5.
38We discuss the role of firm preferences on matching patterns at the end of Section 2.2.
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we fix Nj , the number of workers who chose education level hj, at some nj and we fix
N (j), the number of firms who prefer highly-educated workers at some n(j) such that
nj + 1 < n
(j). In this situation, there are strictly more firms who prefer type hj workers
than there are workers of this type. Let κ = n(j) − nj + 1, and denote pmκ ≡ P (vm > v(κ))
for each m inM+j . Proposition 7.2 says that the difference in the probability of matching
to a type m˜ versus a type m firm at these values of nj and n
(j) in such a situation is given
by
(pm˜κ − pmκ) q
+
m˜/cκ + pmκ
(
q+m˜ − q
+
m
)
/cκ,(3.8)
with
cκ ≡
∑
m∈M+j
pmκq
+
m,
where q+m = qm/
∑
m∈M+j
qm. Under Assumption 3.2, the case of β0 = 0 gives us that
pmk = pm˜k, implying that the first term in the parentheses of equation 3.8 is zero. This
means that when matching frictions are highest (i.e., when β0 = 0), the difference in the
probability of matching to one type of firm that prefers hj over another is captured by the
relative prevalence of those types of firms in the economy.
In the case that β0 > 0, Assumption 3.2 implies that pm˜κ − pmκ becomes larger as
km˜ − km becomes larger. This means that higher capital firms have a better chance of
matching with the high education workers when β0 > 0. On the other hand, in the case
that nj + 1 > n
(j) (i.e., hj is demanded by fewer firms than there are in the economy),
then the above probabilities once again depend solely on the relative prevalence of the
each type of firm.
4. A Small Monte Carlo Simulation Study
In this section, we investigate the finite sample size and power properties of the estima-
tor of preferences, θˆn(β), under a variety of parameters and functional form assumptions.
The results in this section are for the case where the matching technology, β, is known to
the econometrician.
We consider the following general structure for the worker’s expected utility function:
U˜i = (fi + gi) /2 + d(Hi)εi,
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TABLE 1. The Empirical Coverage Probability of Parametric Bootstrap Con-
fidence Intervals for a′θ0 at 95% Nominal Level When β0 is Known.
Specification
β0 g1, f1 g1, f2 g2, f1 g2, f2
0 n = 500 0.9540 0.9600 0.9640 0.9720
n = 1000 0.9480 0.9480 0.9480 0.9480
1 n = 500 0.9360 0.9560 0.9740 0.9680
n = 1000 0.9400 0.9580 0.9480 0.9420
2 n = 500 0.9320 0.9700 0.9740 0.9660
n = 1000 0.9360 0.9660 0.9460 0.9460
3 n = 500 0.9360 0.9660 0.9740 0.9620
n = 1000 0.9460 0.9740 0.9400 0.9520
Notes: The table reports the empirical coverage probability of the parametric boot-
strap confidence interval for a′θ0, where a = (1, 1)
′ and θ0 = (1, 1)
′. The simulated
rejection probability at the true parameter is close to the nominal size of α = 0.05.
The simulation number is R = 500. In each of the iterations, the bootstrap number
is B = 200.
TABLE 2. Average Length of Parametric Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for
a′θ0 at 95% Nominal Level When β0 is Known.
Specification
β0 g1, f1 g1, f2 g2, f1 g2, f2
0 n = 500 0.9186 1.0630 1.7494 1.1045
n = 1000 0.6509 0.7819 0.6826 0.7889
1 n = 500 0.8702 1.1872 1.3817 1.1953
n = 1000 0.6239 0.8676 0.6730 0.8581
2 n = 500 0.8733 1.2912 0.9566 1.2896
n = 1000 0.6320 0.9491 0.6588 0.9350
3 n = 500 0.8851 1.4045 0.9542 1.3866
n = 1000 0.6460 1.0349 0.6706 1.0110
Notes: This table reports the average length of the asymptotic confidence interval
for a′θ0, where a = (1, 1)
′ and θ0 = (1, 1)
′. The lengths of the of the confidence
intervals decrease with n. The simulation number is R = 500 and the bootstrap
number is B = 200.
where θ = (θ1, θ2)
′ ∈ R2, Xi ∈ R
2, and d(Hi) is a 2 × 1 vector with one in the Hi-th row
where Hi takes values of one or two. Xi = (X1i, X2i)
′ are drawn independently across
i and one another from U [0, 1]. Firm capital takes the value of 1/2 and 1 with equal
probability. We also suppose that εi ∈ R
2 follows the extreme value distribution so that
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the best response probability function has the logit structure. η is drawn independently
from the standard normal distribution. We use 100 draws of beta random variables to
compute the matching probabilities. We also interpolate the supports of N (j) and N(j) so
that they have n/50 support points rather than n− 1 support points. In our experiments,
we set the true value of preferences to be θ0 = (1, 1)
′.
We consider two functional forms for the production function which we call fi1 and
fi2:
fi1 = θ1Hi · πi(θ, β)
′k, and
fi2 = θ1(Hi + πi(θ, β)
′k).
fi1 implies production complementarities between the worker and firm variables whereas
any complementarities in fi2 are forced through the worker’s expectation of firm capital
π′ik. We also consider the performance of the inference under two versions of the outside
option, gi1 and gi2:
gi1 = exp(Hi ·Xiθ2), and
gi2 = Hi exp(Xiθ2).
Note that these choices of the outside option function ensure non-negativity. For each
simulation sample, the Hi’s are generated as follows. First, we solve for fixed point in
the best response operator to obtain P∗.39 Then we compute the best response at the
simulated covariates
Ψi(Hi|Xi,P
∗
−i) =
exp(U˜∗i (Hi, Xi))∑2
j=1 exp(U˜
∗
i (Hj , Xi))
.
Letting Ψ∗i (Xi) ≡ Ψi(Hi|Xi,P
∗
−i) we then generate the actions as,
Hi = 1{Ψ
∗
i1 > ωi}
where ωi’s are drawn iid from the uniform distribution on [0, 1].
5. Conclusion
This paper presents an empirical strategy for studying wages and education in a labour
market where the decisions of workers matter in the matching process. We demonstrate
the feasibility of our approach in the case that the worker faces a choice between two
education levels.
39In experiments with different starting values, iterating the best response operator yielded the same fixed
point each time.
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One limitation of the current approach is its reliance on cross-sectional variation alone
for inference. In effect, useful information concerning unemployment and job-to-job
transitions by workers is unused in our framework.
This paper has also demonstrated how the decision to invest in education - and wage
inequality - is sensitive to the presence of a particular source of matching frictions in
the economy. Although firm capital is exogenous in this paper, the role of information
frictions on capital accumulation in an extended framework could be a fruitful way to
study not only wage inequality, but also economic growth.
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6. Appendix A: Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the incomplete information game of
Section 2.2. First, we introduce a representation of the worker’s expected utility function
that proves useful for establishing the existence of the Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the
game as a fixed point of a best probability response operator. We begin by defining
relevant terms. A profile of strategy functions (or decision rules) is
σ = {σi(xi, εi) : i ∈ Nh},
where the functions σi : X ×R
J−1 → H. The conditional probability that a worker with
covariates xi chooses action hi can be written
Pi(hi|xi, σi) ≡
∫
1{σi(xi, εi) = hi}dF (εi).
SinceXi’s are private information in this model, each agent imust take expectations with
respect to the distribution of X−i. The following result shows that under the indepen-
dence assumptions embodied by Assumption 2.1, the agent’s expected utility has a very
convenient form - it is only affected by the behaviour of the other agents through the
choice probabilities.
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Lemma 6.1. In the model of Section (2.2) and Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, we can represent
the first term in the expected utility of agent i from equation 2.4 as
U˜i(hi, xi, σ) =
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)
∏
j 6=i
Pj(hj|σj).
Proof. First, we write equation 2.4 as
U˜i(hi, xi, σ) =
∑
x−i∈X−i
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)P−i(h−i|x−i, σ)P (x−i),(6.1)
where x−i = (xj)j∈Nh\{i} and we use the shorthand P (x−i) ≡ P (X−i = x−i). Without loss
of generality, let i = 1. Then we write U˜1(h1, x1, σ) as
(6.2)
∑
h−1∈H−1
∑
x2∈X
...
∑
xn∈X
u˜1(h1, h−1, x1)P−1(h−1|x2, ..., xn, σ)
nh∏
j=2
Pj(xj),
where we used the independence of Xi’s from Assumption 2.1. Next, since Assumption
2.1 says thatXi’s and εi’s are independent, we know that the actions of each of the agents
are independent and depend only on their personal value of Xi and εi. Therefore,
P (h−1|x2, ..., xn, σ) =
nh∏
j=2
Pj(hj |x2, ...xn, σj) =
nh∏
j=2
Pj(hj |xj, σj).(6.3)
Plugging (6.3) back into (6.2) yields that U˜1(h1, x1, σ) is equal to
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)
∑
x2∈X
...
∑
xn∈X
nh∏
j=2
Pj(hj |xj, σj)
nh∏
j=2
Pj(xj).(6.4)
Grouping the sums in (6.4) and restoring the generic i index gives∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)
∏
j 6=i
∑
xj∈X
Pj(hj|Xj = xj , σj)Pj(xj)
and hence we have the desired result. 
We will show the existence of the equilibrium for our model. The solution concept for
the game described in Section 2.2 is Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE), which we now
define.
Definition 6.1. A Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) of the game described in Section (2.2)
is a profile of decision rules σ∗ such that for any player i and for any (xi, εi):
σ∗i (xi, εi) = argmax hi∈H {Ui(hi, xi, εi, σ
∗)} .(6.5)
The notation and arguments in this section follow Aguirregabiria and Mira (2019), but
we include them here for completeness. Under Assumption 2.2, we write the expected
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utility of i as
Ui(hi, xi, σ, εi) = U˜i(hi, xi, σ) + ε
′
id(hi).
By Lemma 6.1 we can express the first term on the right hand side of the the preceding
equation as
U˜i(hi, xi, σ) =
∑
h−i∈H−i
u˜i(hi, h−i, xi)
∏
j∈Nh\{i}
Pj(hj |σj).
Note that U˜i(hi, xi, σ) only depends on the choices of other agents through the choice
probabilities of the other players that are induced by σ. We write the choice probabilities
of the people other than i as
P−i ≡ {Pj(hj) : (j, hj) ∈ N\{i} × H\{1}}.
For any P−i, we can define a best response probability function as:
Ψ˜i(hi|xi,P−i) ≡
∫
1{argmax hi∈HU˜i(hi, xi, σ) + ε
′
id(hi) = hi}dF (εi).
Ψ˜i tells us the probability that a particular action is optimal for i with covariates xi when
others choose according to probabilities P−i.
40 Let
Ψi(hi|P−i) =
∑
xi∈X
Ψ˜i(hi|xi,P−i)P (xi).
An equivalent to Definition 1 6.5 is that the equilibrium probabilities, P∗ ≡ P(σ∗), satisfy
the fixed point constraint,P∗ = Ψ(P∗), whereΨ is the best response probability mapping:
(6.6) Ψ(P) = {Ψi(hi|P−i) : (i, hi) ∈ N ×H\{1}}.
Lemma 6.2. Under Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 2.2 the game described in Section (2.2)
has a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Let P ≡ [0, 1]n×(J−1). Note that P is a compact and convex set. Since Ψ(·) maps
from P to itself and is continuously differentiable by the continuity of εi’s (Assumption
2.1)), Ψ(·) has a fixed point by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. 
We can demonstrate that the Bayesian equilibrium is unique under mild conditions on
the derivatives of the best response probability mapping. Define Jn(P ) ≡
∂Ψ(P )
∂P ′
− In,
where In is the identity matrix and let det(An) denote the determinant of an n-by-n
40Note that when εi’s have the extreme value distribution (as in Assumption 3.2) then we have
Ψ˜i(hi|xi,P−i) =
exp(U˜i(hi, xi))∑J
j=1 exp(U˜i(hj , xi))
.
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matrix, An. A result of Kellogg (1976), as stated in Konovalov and Sa´ndor (2010), says
that the equilibrium is unique if Ψ has no fixed points on the boundary of P and provided
that det(Jn(P )) is non-zero for each P ∈ P. Note that under the conditions of Lemma
6.2, Jn(P ), is a matrix with −1’s on the diagonal and ϕ(P ) = ∂Ψi(P )/∂pj for all i 6= j
(the off-diagonals). Therefore, Jn(P ) is a circulant matrix implying the following explicit
formula:
det(Jn(P )) = (ϕ(P ) · (n− 1)− 1) (−(1 + ϕ(P )))
n−1 .
This determinant is guaranteed to be non-zero provided that ϕ(P ) 6= 1/(n − 1) for
every P ∈ P and n ≥ 2. In our setup, the requirement that Ψ have no fixed points on the
boudnary of P holds under weak conditions on the distribution of ε′is.
7. Appendix B: First-Stage Estimation of θ0
7.1. Characterization of Matching Probabilities
The remaining results of this section allow us to represent the matching probabilities
from equation 3.6, hence workers’ expectations, in a convenient way. These representa-
tions can then be used to estimate θ(β) using maximum likelihood.
Proposition 7.1. Suppose that Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 3.1, 3.2 hold, and that J = 2. Then
the probability that any worker i matches to a firm from capital class m conditional on
choosing education level hj is
πmj =
∑nh−1
nj=0
P (M(i) = m|Hi = hj , Nj = nj)B(nj ;nh − 1, pj),
for eachm = 1, ...,M and each hj ∈ H, where Nj is the number of workers other than i who
picked education level hj, B(nj;nh − 1, pj) is the binomial p.m.f. and pj = P (Hi = hj).
Proof. Part (a) of Assumption 3.1 that says firms do not consider the workers’ covariates
when ranking them in the matching process. This means that for each m = 1, ...,M we
have that
P (M(i) = m|Hi = hj , H−i = h−i, Xi = xi) = P (M(i) = m|Hi = hj , H−i = h−i).
Combining this with equation 3.6, we can write
π
(i)
mj =
∑
h−i∈H−i
P (M(i) = m|Hi = hj , H−i = h−i)P (H−i = h−i|Xi = xi).
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Next, it is straightfoward to see that41
(7.2) P (H−i = h−i|Xi = xi) =
nh∏
j 6=i
Pj(hj).
Since εi are identically distributed by Assumption 2.1, for each j and m, have π
(i)
mj = πmj .
When there are only two education levels, any h−i ∈ H−i can be represented as a total
number of workers other than i who picked education level hj , nj . From worker i’s point
of view, nj is a particular realization of the random variable Nj that takes values in the
set {0, ..., nh−1}. Since there are nh−1 agents other than i in the economy, the sum over
h−i ∈ H−i amounts to a sum over the support of Nj. Now consider any nj in the support
of Nj . The assumption that εi’s are iid implies that the probability that exactly nj out of
nh − 1 workers pick hj can be represented as
(nh − 1)!
nj !(nh − 1− nj)!
p
nj
j (1− pj)
nh−1−nj ,
which is the binomial probability mass function, B(nj ;nh − 1, pj). 
When J = 2 we can partition the types of firms, m = 1, ...,M into two sets: those who
prefer hj ∈ H and those who prefer hj′ with j
′ 6= j. It is convenient to introduce the
following notation:
M+j (θ) = {m ∈ {1, ...,M} : ρ(km, hj; θ) ≥ ρ(km, hj′; θ), j 6= j
′}, and(7.3)
M−j (θ) = {1, ...,M}\M
+
j ,(7.4)
41This can be shown using the same arguments as those in Lemma 6.1. The private information and
independence of Xi’s (Assumption 2.1) implies that the left hand size of 7.2 equals∑
x−i∈X−i
P (h−i|x−i, xi)P (x−i|xi) =
∑
x−i∈X−i
P (h−i|x−i)P (x−i).(7.1)
Suppose without loss of generality that i = 1. It is convenient to rewrite the above as follows (using
independence): ∑
x2∈X
...
∑
xn∈X
P (h−1|x2, ..., xn)
nh∏
j=2
Pj(xj).
Next, since Xi’s and εi’s are independent across i and each i’s strategy function is only a function of Xi and
εi we have
P (h−1|x−1) =
nh∏
j 6=1
Pj(hj |x−1) =
nh∏
j 6=1
Pj(hj |xj).
Combining these two results we write 7.1 as∑
x2∈X
Pj(h2|x2)Pj(x2)...
∑
xn∈X
Pn(hn|xn)Pn(xn) =
nh∏
j 6=1
Pj(hj).
33
recalling that firm preferences are given in 2.8. The firm classes that prefer hj are pinned
down by the functional form for firm preferences, ρ, the preference parameter, θ, and the
distribution of Xi. Furthermore let us denote
πmj ≡
nf∑
n(j)=0
nh−1∑
nj=0
Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m)P (nj)P (n
(j); θ),(7.5)
where
Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m) = P (M(i) = m|hi = hj , Nj = nj, N
(j) = n(j)).(7.6)
Note that this object depends on both β and θ through the matching function. For each
firm type m = 1, ...M let Fm ≡ N(βkm, σ
2), and define the following for each education
choice hj:
Gj+ ≡
∑
m∈M+j
qmFm and Gj− ≡
∑
m∈M−j
qmFm.
Furthermore, define the posterior firm types as follows:
q+m ≡ qm/
∑
m∈M+j
qm and q
−
m ≡ qm/
∑
m∈M−j
qm.
We also define v(b1,b2;F ) as the b1-order statistic of b2 random variables independently dis-
tributed according to cdf F . Propositions 7.2 and 7.3 are characterizations of Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m)’s
of the model in the case that J = 2 and nh = nf = n.
When considering these results, it is important to recall one core feature of the match-
ing model as we outline it in Section 2: that there is no unemployment. Therefore, when
reading the arguments, the reader should take for granted the fact that the probability
that each worker matches to some firm occurs with probability one.
Proposition 7.2. (Heterogeneous firm preferences). Denote n¯j ≡ nj + 1 and suppose that
nh = nf = n. Then under the assumptions of Proposition 7.1 we have the following for any
nj such that 1 ≤ nj ≤ n and n
(j) such that 0 < n(j) < n:
i) For each m ∈M+j ,
Phj ,nj,n(j)(m) =


q+mn
(j)/n¯j if n¯j ≥ n
(j)
P (vm>vˆ)q
+
m∑
m∈M+
j
P (vm>vˆ)q
+
m
if n¯j < n
(j) ,
where vˆ ≡ v(a,b;F ) with a = n
(j) − n¯j , b = n
(j), and F = Gj+.
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ii) For each m ∈M−j ,
Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m) =


P (vm<vˆ)q
−
m((n¯j−n(j))/n¯j)
∑
m∈M−
j
P (vm<vˆ)q
−
m
if n¯j > n
(j)
0 if n¯j ≤ n
(j)
,
where vˆ ≡ v(a,b;F ) with a = n¯j − n
(j) + 1, b = n− n(j), and F = Gj−.
Proof. We begin by introducing some notation. We denote the event that a worker i who
chose education level hj matches to any firm of type m ∈M
+
j orm ∈M
−
j asM
+
ij andM
−
ij
respectively.42
First, we consider the probability that a worker who chose hj matches to any firm in
the class m ∈ M+j . Consider the case that n¯j ≥ n
(j). In this case, there are at least as
many workers who chose hj as firms who prefer hj . Given that Condition IR implies that
no worker or firm will never unilaterally dissolve a match to become unmatched, the case
of n¯j ≥ n
(j) implies that every firm in class m who wants a worker with hj will hire one
in the matching process. For each class of firm m ∈ M+j , the probability that a worker
who chose hj matches to a firm in the set of firms that prefers hj and to the particular
class m ∈ M+j is given as follows when n¯j ≥ n
(j):
Pj(Mi = m,M
+
ij ) = Pj(Mi = m|M
+
ij )Pj(M
+
ij ).
= q+mn
(j)/n¯j ,
where the j-subscript on the probabilities denote a probability conditional on the event
Hi = hj . Pj(M
+
ij ) is equal to n
(j)/n¯j because workers with the same hj are indistinguish-
able to the firms that prefer them, so firms choose among these workers at random. The
probability of matching to a firm of type m ∈ M+j given that the worker has already
matched to some firm in M+j is equal to the relative proportion of type m firms in this
category, q+m.
Next, we consider the case that n¯j < n
(j). Since there are strictly more firms that prefer
hj than workers who chose hj, the probability that a worker who chose hj matches to a
firm that prefers workers with hj occurs with probability one; that is Pj(M
+
ij ) = 1.
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Although Pj(M
+
ij ) = 1, only the firms with the n¯j largest v-indices will be able to match
with a worker who chose hj. Thus, a firm inM
+
j matches to a worker with hj if and only
if its v statistic exceeded the κ = n(j)− n¯j order statistic among all n
(j) firms inM+j . Thus,
42That is, M+ij ≡ {Mi ∈M
+
j } and similarly forM
−
ij ≡ {Mi ∈M
+
j }.
43This follows from Condition IR and the following two facts: i) hj workers are scarce relative to the firms
that prefer them ii) firms that prefer hj′ will never choose a hj worker in the matching process since the
condition nh = nf = n and J = 2 implies that hj′ workers are always available (i.e., when nh = nf = n,
n(j) > n¯j implies that nj′ > n
(j′), since nj′ = n− n¯j and n(j
′) = n− n(j)).
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by Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the probability that a worker who chose hj matches with a
firm from a particular class m ∈M+j conditional on matching to some firm inM
+
j is
P (v(K) = v(km)|v(K) > vˆ,m ∈M
+
j ),
which by Bayes’ rule equals
P (v(K) > vˆ|v(K) = v(km), m ∈M
+
j )P (v(K) = v(km)|m ∈M
+
j )∑
m∈M+j
P (v(K) > vˆ|v(K) = v(km), m ∈M
+
j )P (v(K) = v(km)|m ∈M
+
j )
,(7.7)
where vˆ ≡ v(κ,n(j);Gj+). Equation 7.7 represents the relative proportion of type m firms
represented among threshhold crossers among all firms that prefer hj . We next consider
the probability of matching to each firm with m ∈ M−j . We consider first the case that
n¯j > n
(j). The relevant probability is
Pj(Mi = m,M
−
ij ) = Pj(Mi = m|M
−
ij )Pj(M
−
ij )
= Pj(Mi = m|M
−
ij )(1− n
(j)/n¯j).
As stated above, the of case n¯j > n
(j) combined with our assumption that nh = nf = n
implies that n(j
′) > nj′, since nj′ = n − n¯j and n
(j′) = n − n(j). Therefore by similar
logic to before, firms who prefer hj′ match to workers with hj if their v-index is lower
than the n(j
′) − nj′ + 1 = n¯j − n
(j) + 1 order statistic among those firms in M−j . Letting
κ ≡ n¯j − n
(j) + 1, the probability of a worker who chose hj matching to a type m ∈ M
−
j
firm conditional on matching to some firm in M−ij is given as the proportion of type m
firms whose v index falls below this threshhold:
Pj(Mi = m|M
−
ij ) =
P (vm < vˆ)q
−
m∑
m∈M−j
P (vm < vˆ)q−m
,
where vˆ ≡ v(κ,n(j′);Gj−). Lastly, in the case that n¯j ≤ n
(j), P (M−ij ) = 0. This completes the
proof. 
Next we define G ≡
∑M
m=1 Fmqm. Proposition 7.3 characterizes the matching proba-
bilities in the case that all firms types prefer one level of education; that is, in the case
that firm preferences are homogeneous over worker education types. The arguments are
abridged, since they are very similar to those used in the proof of Proposition 7.2.
Proposition 7.3. (Homogeneous firm preferences). Suppose that nh = nf = n. Then under
the assumptions of Proposition 7.1 we have the following for the cases that n(j) = n and
n(j) = 0.
(1) if n(j) = n, then M−j = ∅ and for each m ∈M
+
j = M we have
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Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m) =

qm if n¯j = nP (vm>vˆ)qm∑
m∈M P (vm>vˆ)qm
if n¯j < n
,
where vˆ ≡ v(a, b;G), with a = n− n¯j and b = n.
(2) If n(j) = 0, then M+j = ∅ and for each m ∈M
−
j = M we have
Phj ,nj ,n(j)(m) =

qm if n¯j = nP (vm<vˆ)qm∑
m∈M P (vm<vˆ)qm
if n¯j < n
,
where vˆ ≡ v(a, b;G), with a = n¯j + 1 and b = n.
Proof. When n(j) = n and n¯j = n the probability of matching to firm m is simply equal to
the marginal probability of that firm type in the economy, qm. When n
(j) = n and n¯j < n,
using logic identical to that employed in the proof of Proposition 7.2, we conclude that
the probability of matching to a firm from class m is equal to the proportion of type m
firms above the n− n¯j order statistic of the v’s.
When n(j) = 0, we must have n¯j > n
(j) = 0 (since at least one person is assumed to
choose hj). Since the top nj′ = n − n¯j ranked firms in terms of v receive a worker with
their preferred education, hj′, the probability of matching to a firm in class m is equal to
the proportion of type m below the n¯j + 1 order statistic of the v’s. 
The following result takes for granted a well-known fact that uniform order statistics
follow the Beta distribution.44
Lemma 7.1. Let: i) {Xi}
n
i=1 be iid random variables from continuous distribution function
G; ii) Z be normally distributed with mean µ and variance σ2; iii) X(i) be the i-th order
statistic of {Xi}
n
i=1; iv) U(i) be the i-th order statistic of iid uniform random variables {Ui}
n
i=1.
Then,
P (Z ≥ X(i)) = 1− EΦ((G
−1(U(i))− µ)/σ),
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf, and E(·) is taken over the distribution of U(i), which
follows the Beta distribution with parameters i and n+ 1− i.
Proof. Note that sinceXi’s are continuously distributed according to G it follows from the
probability integral transformation result that for each i
Xi =d G
−1(Ui).
44For example, see Chapter 2 Ahsanullah, Nevzorov and Shakil (2013).
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Also, since G is monotone we have that for each i
X(i) =d G
−1(U(i)).
The previous line implies that
P (Z ≥ X(i)) = P (Z ≥ G
−1(U(i)))
= 1− P (Z ≤ G−1(U(i)))
= 1− EΦ((G−1(U(i))− µ)/σ),
where E(·) is taken over the distribution of U(i). The last equality used the fact that Z is
normal with mean µ and variance σ2. 
The following results are a direct application of the previous results. They are useful
for constructing the πmj ’s that are used in the structural estimation of this paper. Recall
the definitions of G, Gj+, Gj−, and v(b1, b2, F ) from before. We introduce the following
notation:
a(κ, n,m;G) ≡ EΦ
(
(G−1(U(κ;n))− βkm)/σm
)
,
where U(κ;n) is the κ-order statistic of n uniform random variables and E(·) is taken over
the distribution of U(κ;n).
Corollary 7.1. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 7.2 hold and let vm be distributed
according to Fm. Then, in the heterogeneous preferences case with n¯j < n
(j),
(1) For each m ∈M+j , P (vm > v(κ,n(j);Gj+)) = 1− a(κ, n
(j), m;Gj+), where
κ = n(j) − n¯j .
(2) For each m ∈M−j , P (vm < v(κ;n(j′);Gj−)) = a(κ, n
(j′), m;Gj−), where
κ = n¯j − n
(j) + 1.
Corollary 7.2. Suppose the conditions of Proposition 7.3 hold and let vm be distributed
according to Fm. Then, in the homogeneous preferences case with n¯j < n,
(1) If n(j) = 0, P (vm < v(κ;n,G)) = a(κ, n,m;G) for each m ∈M , where κ = n¯j + 1.
(2) If n(j) = n, P (vm > v(κ;n,G)) = 1− a(κ, n,m;G) for each m ∈M , where κ = n− n¯j.
Proof. The proofs of Corollaries 1 and 2 follows directly from Lemma 7.1. 
7.2. Identification of θ0
In extremum estimation problems, it is common to argue that the parameter is identi-
fied via a set of sufficient conditions requiring continuity (or semi-continuity) of the un-
derlying population criterion function. See for example, Newey and McFadden (1994).
In our context, assuming continuity of this criterion function is inappropriate, since the
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probabilities that workers match to certain firm types conditional on their choice of ed-
ucation are discontinuous in θ. The problem arises because these probabilities depend
on the sets of firm types that prefer high and low education, which are discontinuous
functions of θ.45 Under the model of Section 2.2 we provided assumptions under which
it was natural to estimate θ using maximum likelihood. In this section, we show that the
discontinuity of the population likelihood function is not an obstacle to identification. As
we will see, the required conditions are only slightly stronger than those commonly used
to identify the standard logit model.
Before presenting the identification result and the proof, we define terms. The popula-
tion objective function is
Q(θ) = E log ℓi(θ) = E [hi log pi(θ) + (1− hi) log (1− pi(θ))] ,
where pi(θ) = Λ(∆i(θ)), Λ(z) = exp(z)/(1 + exp(z)), and ∆i(θ) = ω1i(θ, β0) − ω0i(θ, β0)
are the population version of the objects in equation 3.7.46 Let us also define ψ(Xi; θ) ≡
g(h1, Xi; θ)− g(h0, Xi; θ) and write the probability of high education as
pi(θ) = Λ (τ · (f1(θ, β0)− f0(θ, β0)) + (1− τ) · ψ(Xi; θ))
= Λ (τ · Φ(θ)′Π(θ) + (1− τ) · ψ(Xi; θ)) ,
where
Π(θ) ≡ (π1(θ, β0), π0(θ, β0))
′ ∈ R2M×1,
Φ(θ) ≡ (φ1(θ), −φ0(θ) )
′ ∈ R2M×1,
and φj(θ)
′ ≡ (f(hj , k1; θ), ..., f(hj, kM ; θ))
′ ∈ RM×1, for j = 0, 1. We are now ready to
present the main result of this section.
Theorem 7.1. θ0 is identified up to β0 and uniquely maximizes Q(θ) over θ ∈ Θ if
(1) For each θ ∈ Θ such that θ 6= θ0, ψ¯i(θ, θ0) ≡ ψ(Xi, θ) − ψ(Xi, θ0) is continuously
distributed, and
(2) for each θ ∈ Θ, |Φ(θ)Π(θ)| <∞ and E|ψ(Xi; θ)| <∞.
Proof. For this result, we will use the well-known fact that in maximum likelihood prob-
lems, identification implies unique maximization.47 θ0 is identified and Q(θ) has a unique
45Recall the definitions in equation 7.4.
46Note that our notation in this section will occasionally omit β0 for the purposes of clarity.
47For example, See Lemma 2.2 of Newey and McFadden (1994)
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maximum at θ0 if for all θ ∈ Θ with θ 6= θ0
P (ℓi(θ) 6= ℓi(θ0)) > 0, and(7.8)
E| log ℓi(θ)| <∞.(7.9)
We begin by showing that equation 7.8 holds when ψ¯i(θ, θ0) is continuously distributed.
Since Λ(z) and 1−Λ(z) are strictly monotonic in z, we will show equation 7.8 by proving
that for all θ 6= θ0
(7.10) P (∆i(θ) 6= ∆i(θ0)) > 0.
To establish this, we define some notation. Let M(θ) refer to the set of firm types
that prefers high education.48 Define the relation ∼ on Θ to be θ ∼ θ′ if and only if
M(θ) = M(θ′). Since ∼ is an equivalence relation on Θ, it can be partitioned into a union
of S equivalence classes, Θ = ∪Ss=1Θs, where S is equal to the number of firm types plus
one. Note that the only way in which θ affects Π(θ) is through M(θ). Hence cs = Π(θ) is
constant over θ ∈ Θs on each partition s = 1, ..., S. Therefore, it follows that 7.10 holds
since for all θ ∈ Θ\{θ0} and each s, we have that
P
(
ψ¯i(θ, θ0) 6=
τ
1− τ
(Φ(θ)′cs − Φ(θ0)
′c0)
)
= 1.(7.11)
Equation 7.11 is true because ψ¯i is continuously distributed and the right-hand-side of
the inequality is non-stochastic. Lastly, we show that equation 7.9 holds. Note that
| log ℓi(θ)| ≤ 2× | log Λ(∆i(θ))|
≤ 2× (| log Λ(0)|+ |∆i(θ)|) .
Taking expectations of both sides and applying the second condition gives the result. 
The requirement that E|ψ(Xi; θ)| < ∞ follows under familiar circumstances. For ex-
ample, when we take an outside option of g(h, x; θ) = h · x′θ, the condition follows from
the existence of finite second moments. Our condition is more general so as to allow
additional flexibility in the choice of g. The existence of |Φ(θ)Π(θ)| is also satisfied un-
der very mild assumptions. Since π1(θ, β0) and π0(θ, β0) are always bounded between
zero and one, a sufficient condition for the existence of |Φ(θ)Π(θ)| is that f be such that
f 2(h, k; θ) <∞ for each θ ∈ Θ, h, and k.
The following result establishes a set of sufficient assumptions for the first condition of
Theorem 7.1.
48Our apparent focus on firm types that prefer high education is without loss of generality since any M(θ)
also uniquely defines an associated set of firm types that prefers low education.
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Lemma 7.2. Suppose that (a) Xi is continuously distributed and (b) the outside option
function g is such that (i) g(h, x; θ) = g(h, x′θ) and (ii) g(h1, z) − g(h0, z) is strictly mono-
tonic in z. Then ψ¯i(θ, θ0) is continuously distributed for all θ 6= θ0.
Proof. Since Xi is continuously distributed and g(h1, z)− g(h0, z) is strictly monotonic in
z, then ψi(Xi; θ) = g(h1, X
′
iθ) − g(h0, X
′
iθ) is itself continuously distributed. Thus, for all
θ 6= θ0 it follows that ψ¯i(θ, θ0) = ψi(Xi; θ)−ψi(Xi; θ0) is also continuously distributed. 
For example, it is clear that linear outside option functions satisfy the conditions of
the above lemma. An example of a non-linear outside option function satisfying the
conditions is g(h, x′θ) = exp(h · x′θ).49
Consistency of θˆn(β0) holds when the data are iid and Θ is compact under Theorem
2.5. of Newey and McFadden (1994), under the additional requirement that the likeli-
hood function be continuous at each θ ∈ Θ with probability one. As pointed out by the
authors, the latter condition is mild in the sense that it does not require the likelihood
be continuous at every θ for a given realization of the random variables. In our con-
text, this requirement is satisfied if the probability that a firm is indifferent between a
worker with high and low education is zero for every value of the preference parame-
ter, θ. Asymptotic normality of θˆn(β) then follows provided the conditions of Theorem
3.3 of Newey and McFadden (1994) hold. One of the requirements of this asymptotic
normality theorem is that the population density be twice differentiability in θ within a
neighborhood of θ0. Although the density in our context is not guaranteed to be differen-
tiable for every θ ∈ Θ, it may nonetheless satisfy this much weaker requirement of twice
differentiability in a neighborhood of the true parameter.
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